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  1A PROBLEMATIC ABSENSE characterises sociology’s relationship with EU studies. 
Although potentially one of the disciplines that might bring a much needed ‘bottom up’ 
view of the origins and sources of European integration – along with social history, 
anthropology, social psychology, human geography – its contributions have been 
scattered and marginal. Dominant understandings of European integration remain wedded 
to the resolutely ‘top down’ view of IR theory, law, diplomatic history. Sociological 
claims and argumentation were very much at the heart of the classic studies of Haas 
(1958) on elite socialisation to the European project, or Deutsch (1957) on increased 
interaction between nationals of the continent, as the two surest routes to regional 
integration. Yet today sociologists barely feature among the participants at mainstream 
EU conferences. You can usually count the number of practicing sociology faculty at 
EUSA on one hand – although we are delighted to note that Neil Fligstein has joined the 
executive committee! – and, on a good day, as Neil Fligstein could testify, you might 
need two to count the number of sociologists at the American Sociological Association 
conference who have any interest in  European integration. While sociological sounding 
questions can be found everywhere in EU studies, yet sociologists apparently are not at 
the party. 
 
In recent critical literature reviews we have attempted to round up and summarise the 
existing ‘sociological’ style literature, as well as point to new and ongoing work that 
seems to advance a new agenda for sociology in EU studies (Favell 2006; Guiraudon 
2006; also circulated). The focus there was on re-stating a case for an empirical political 
sociology of the EU – influenced in large part by the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, and 
  2most widely developed by French scholars – that homes in on the social backgrounds, 
careers, and organisational strategies of recognisable EU actors operating in the “political 
field” of Brussels (see Guiraudon 2001; Favell 1998). Partly, this is a reworking of 
familiar objects and events of study into a different conceptual language. Partly too, we 
admit, our agenda is also a “turf war” kind of exercise: driven by a certain frustration 
with the way other disciplines have moved in to “sociological” terrain – notably the 
social constructivists in IR – without necessarily being driven by core sociological 
questions, or indeed using recognisably empirical sociological strategies. Another big 
frustration is the regretful identification of sociology with debates in social theory – 
Habermas, Giddens, Beck and others (the best of this kind of work in EU studies is 
represented by the recent textbook by Delanty and Rumford 2005) – or with normative 
approaches to (again, the best of which might be work associated with ARENA in Oslo, 
i.e. Eriksen 2005 or Bellamy/Castiglione 2006). These approaches are established and 
evolving in their own ways, but are not necessarily aiding the development of an 
empirical sociology of European integration.  
 
Here, we go beyond the critical reviews, to offer another, different grounding for 
sociology in EU studies. First, we turn the question around. Instead of critiquing would-
be sociological approaches out there, we rather ask why sociology as a discipline – whose 
central object of study is “society” – finds it so difficult to study the EU. The answer lies 
in the great difficulties it has transcending the theoretical and methodological problem of 
“methodological nationalism”, especially when it comes to a collective social entity such 
as the EU that is neither a nation, a state or a society. Second, we will consider the 
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European integration: that is, the question of what are the “social bases of European 
integration”, a question that would restore the biggest sociological question of all to the 
mainstream EU studies agenda. 
 
The curse of methodological nationalism: a quick snapshot of contemporary 
sociology (with a capital ‘S’) 
 
Why have nominal sociologists (as opposed, say, to political scientists or lawyers with a 
sociological sensibility) failed to study European integration? There is, to be fair, a huge 
Transatlantic divide on this point, which we will elaborate on.  
 
Sociology in Europe is Europeanised enough; that is not the problem. European 
sociologists have their own European journals and associations (such as Innovation, 
European Societies, ESA, ECSR); they work on the same European commission funded 
projects that keep us all busy. But it is fair to say that little of this work connects up with 
the mainstream of EU studies, as represented for example at EUSA. One issue is that 
sociology in Europe is not dominated by empiricists, but by social theorists.  Such is the 
influence and expansion in European sociology (especially in Britain) of inter-
disciplinary, humanities inspired theorising in discourse and text-based media, gender, 
communications and cultural studies, that empiricism as such is seen as a bad thing. The 
biggest name theorists – Giddens, Bauman, Beck and Urry –  thus preach for a 
cosmopolitan or global sociology ‘beyond societies’ or ‘methodological nationalism’ 
  4(which is indeed the correct problematic to point to), but none have shown any interest in 
studying Europe or the EU in a contextualised, comparative or empirically specified way. 
Empiricism as such is a bad word for many social theorists. The baby of empirical 
methodology was thrown out with the bathwater of positivism. So there is work inspired 
by Habermas and Foucault that focuses on Europe and has some relationship with 
mainstream EU studies (worthy of note are, respectively, the work of Trenz/Eder 2005; 
and Bigo 1996) , but most work in these paradigms is shot through with the normative 
baggage and anti-positivist stance of critical theory. The Bourdieusian agenda in French 
political sociology of the EU is the big exception, as we document elsewhere in our 
review articles. Bourdieu – unlike archetypal ‘grand theorists’ like Habermas or Giddens 
– was above all an empirical sociologist. While critical of naïve positivism, he was also 
hostile to theory for theory’s sake, endorsing rather a kind of post-post positivist position 
on epistemology (see especially the manifesto laid out in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)  
It is a shame that French political science influenced by Bourdieu is not a better known 
literature in mainstream anglo-american EU studies. This French literature could be a 
model for a revived political sociology of the EU, in the midst of a mainstream political 
science of the EU, that has with anglo-american political science everywhere, removed 
political sociology from its agenda. Yet, excepting this Bourdieusian sociology, it is quite 
remarkable how little all the grand talk of contemporary social theory – about 
transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, mobilities, hybridity, identities, public spheres, 
governmentality, risk society, modernity, postmodernity, reflexive modernization, or 
whatever – has to offer to studying contemporary European or the EU in empirical terms 
  5that have anything in common with how mainstream EU studies scholars approach the 
field.  
 
In North America, the problems are completely different. Social theory in American 
sociology is practically dead and buried; sociology is a resolutely empiricist and, 
hegemonically speaking, quantitative discipline. That’s not the problem necessarily, but 
try attending the ASA as a ‘Europeanist’. The vast majority of American sociologists still 
study the US as if it were the sociology of the modern world, studying processes (of 
stratification, labor conflicts, education, immigrant assimilation, race relations, culture 
etc) exclusively within this one society. Recent ASA conferences stressing the policy 
relevance of American sociological research – as in the good old days of the 60s and 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s “great society”  – sees the discipline chasing after a narrow national 
relevance which only makes it all the more provincial. Within this, the notion of a “global 
sociology” is as marginal as can be, and comparativists and regional specialists have to 
take refuge in interdisciplinary area studies, which rise and fall according to State Dept 
security priorities. So funding for Middle Eastern, Euroasian and Chinese studies is hot 
right now in the US, while Europe, especially Western Europe, is nowhere. We should in 
short not hold our breath waiting for American sociology to have much to say about 
Europe.  
 
There are noble exceptions of course, but remarkably few sociologists in North America 
– even those with European interests – know or care much about the EU. European 
sociologists, meanwhile, seem to working in a parallel universe. This leads to a further 
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‘methodological nationalism’ it finds almost technically impossible to transcend 
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). For example, RC28, the international gathering of 
social stratification scholars, certainly does pursue comparative work on western 
industrial societies, but they rely exclusively on data that identifies and counts class 
distinctions, occupations or social mobility on a strictly society-by-society basis, so that 
the variation they study is always cross-national. Whether it is UN, OECD, national or 
international government data that is used, it is very difficult to systematically study pan- 
or trans- national social structures and phenomena because of the way nation-states have 
carved up the world and its populations, statistically speaking. In fact, it is a historical 
artefact of the modern world: the statistical technology of states is itself a vital 
constitutive part of the modern nation-state system. Even at the heart of the EU’s 
statistical system – Eurostat, Eurobarometer – the mindset of methodological nationalism 
is reproduced, so that researchers are always more focused on how and why France 
differs on Europe from Britain or the Netherlands, but rarely on the social classes, 
networks, identities or attitudes that might cut across these national divides. It is national 
variation that keep European politicians awake at night in anticipation of the next 
political rejection, but this obsession with document national differences within Europe in 
fact prevents lateral thinking about the structures of European economy and society. 
 
Another case in point are the welfare states/varieties of capitalism scholars, many of 
whom are sociologists (or political sociologists), and constitute one of the largest 
battalion of Europeanists in the US and Europe.  In case you don’t know who these are 
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Studies, the sister conference of this one, that happens on alternate years. The themes and 
agendas of these two conferences have, in recent years, drifted apart. A good example is 
the debate centered on Esping-Andersen’s Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Society, 
one of the single most important recent works on the future of the Europe welfare state, 
and a virtual bible of progressive thinkers and policy makers in terms of the post-Lisbon 
‘flexicurity’ agenda. Esping-Andersen’s certainly brilliant work is however locked in the 
methodological nationalist mode: it is a Europe of varieties, indeed ‘worlds’, of welfare 
capitalism, in which the European Union, or European regional integration processes are 
barely even mentioned. How quaint you might think— although it is a standard practice 
among the majority of American Europeanists studying Europe, and a feature of the work 
of the most prominent Europeans involved in these circles. Yet Esping-Andersen’s fame 
is deserved. The book tackles the complex interlocking relationship between the 
historical shift from manufacturing to service economies, social and employment 
legislation, economic growth and unemployment, child birth rates and child care, and the 
crisis of demography and ageing in European societies, offering an intellectual grounding 
for the Scandinavian ‘flexicurity’ agenda as a solution; it is, in short, a book about the 
future of Europe in the most fundamental structural sense. So we might laugh and say 
how can a book about the future of Europe fail to mention the EU? Well, yes – although, 
in fact, the achilles heel of Esping Andersen is not this, but its failure to discuss low end 
immigration as a now permanent structural feature of European economy and society. 
But the point can be turned around. How can any study that claims to offer a so-called 
‘theory of European integration’ – the body of work we are discussing today – fail to 
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reflected in the varieties of capitalism/welfare states debates? The European Commission 
certainly is thinking about these things. The Lisbon agenda, of course, is all about this; 
and influential reflections such as the Sapir report are, like Esping-Andersen, centred on 
squaring these very circles. But can we fairly claim that the dominant or challenging 
‘theories of European integration’, that keep legions of EU studies scholars busy, are 
really engaging with this agenda—what is, on reflection, the fundamental theoretical 
issue in Europe today.  
 
Well, ‘Why should we care?’, you might say. As we know, as laid out in overviews such 
as Ben Rosamond’s (2000), debates between inter-governmentalists, neo-functionalists, 
realists and constructivists have consumed acres of forest and hours of conference time. 
But it should surely give us pause for thought that, for example, though Andrew 
Moravscik’s canonical The Choice for Europe (1998) might, in a five minute trawl on 
Google Scholar, be established as the single most cited book in EU studies (at around 700 
cites—we are willing to check for other suggestions), it is half as widely cited as The 
Social Foundations (a 2000 publication), and six times less than Esping-Anderson’s 
earlier Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. For sure, silly numbers games like this tell us 
nothing about the ‘objective’ intellectual importance of any of this work  But it should 
remind us of something: even at its most sublimely self-referential (scholars who gather 
at EUSA are nothing if not highly self-referential, and Google Scholar above all measures 
self-referentiality), EU studies always risks being an intellectual ghetto – and it doesn’t 
even have a monopoly on studying Europe! This point has been made often by scholars 
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Caporaso 1998) where arguments about the EU's sui generis character and methodology 
of n=1 is not likely to get you a job or help you communicate with your colleagues (see 
Verdun 2003 for an incisive discussion of the “American” versus “European” approaches 
to integration theory).  It is also a point by UK EU scholar Simon Bulmer who put it this 
way: “ the lack of interdisciplinary dialogue have risked confining European integration 
to an intellectual 'ghetto' within the social sciences” (1997, p. 8). It becomes absurd if 
there are two ghettos, those studying the EU and those studying European society. 
Perhaps there might just be a relationship between the political/legal/policy construction 
of the EU and its structural viability as a model of European society and economy? It is, 
to say the least, a question worth considering. 
 
This sweep through sociology is a crude, caricatural exercise – that for sure leaves out or 
underplays many worthy efforts of colleagues to do a sociology of European society 
(again see our literature reviews where we try to do everyone justice). But our point is 
maybe that these efforts are so fragmented, and so hidden behind the correct dominant 
perception that sociology is either the quantitative reification of North American society 
or the social theoretical mystification of European modernity, that their efforts have been 
easy to ignore. Our goal here has to be to try and drag sociological concerns about 
Europe somewhere nearer to terrain that those sitting here might recognise as relevant 
and necessary to their own.  
 
The social bases of European integration 
  1 
Our strategy here is to put something understudied back on the EU studies agenda. The 
notion of studying the “social bases of European integration” is taken from a brilliant, 
unjustly neglected paper by Alan Milward, in an idiosyncratic collection of essays on the 
EU edited by the new left review intellectuals, Perry Anderson and Peter Gowan, The 
Question of Europe (1997).
1  
Milward makes the very basic, but fundamental point, that European integration 
ultimately has been driven by the broad wishes and support of European middle classes – 
the same median populations that have determined national political outcomes in the 
post-war period, ensured the maintenance of welfare state and pastoral national 
institutions, and represent the core of European societies. The cliché of EU elites freely 
manipulating a far off population is neither a realistic nor viable model of how post-war 
European economy and society has worked. Any stable and enduring political system 
depends on a broad social basis undergirding it as a political structure. It should be 
sociology’s task to explore this social base: to show how politics is grounded in society 
(and history), not made up sui generis with every fresh election or opinion poll. And 
turning to institutionalism – as is the move frequently made at this point – itself only begs 
the question: what social structures undergird institutions? It is a point made, in a slightly 
different way, by Neil Fligstein in his forthcoming book that will stake out one 
comprehensive view of what an empirical sociology of the EU might look like. Fligstein 
notes that while only 13% of the European population identify primarily as Europeans – 
not a great result after 50+ years of institutional construction, more than 50% sometimes 
do. That is to say, while the majority’s support for the EU is situational and provisional – 
                                                 
1   To put this into perspective, Milward’s paper is cited only twice on Google scholar 
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their orientation – there is in fact not a democratic deficit in Europe but a clear social 
grounding that provides some causal explanation for the success of this fifty year 
construction. EU studies typically studies the stuff that is built up on all this: the treaties, 
policies, laws and institutions that make up the visible business of European politics. 
institutions, policies, and laws. All interesting stuff, but it is all superstructural. The base 
itself remains a mystery. 
 
The issue of course is complicated by the fact that this underlying base to European 
integration might not be something that is measured in easily available attitudinal terms 
or in terms of conventional political indicators: the kind of things political scientists or 
social psychologists typically look for as ‘measurements’ of political society. Fligstein 
starts with attitudes to the EU but his work explores, with all the available given data 
sources, the many ways in which the plurality of Europeans might be measurably found – 
as business elites, moving students, consumer publics etc. In a more critical vein,  neo-
Gramscian scholars in international political economy have hinted at the same point: that 
the European Union is the conspiracy of a newly emergent “transnational capitalist class” 
(van Apeldoorn 2002). Maybe – but this needs empirical documentation and verification 
as a hypothesis (see for instance Caroll and Fennema 2002). The work mentioned above 
signals the need to study the Europeanised/sing behavior of the Europeans underpinning 
the regional integration that they have constructed for themselves, and not just not their 
attitudes to something an elite has constructed for them.  
 
  1Respectable research on public opinion in the EU is limited at how far it gets at these 
questions, although it points to a sociological and geographical agenda. Gabel’s work 
(1998) for instance shows that proximity to borders is linked to the use of EU rights. But 
attitudes are not a good proxy for behaviour on Europe, especially when it is so obvious 
that opinion on the EU runs so far  behind use of EU rights – the Eurosceptic British 
being a good case, as arguably the most voracious in their using of EU rights to buy 
property or relocate to other parts of the EU. The trick of modern political science at this 
point – the fiction of voting as ‘revealed preferences’ – only underlines how little 
scholars know or care about political socialisation. The most common quasi-sociological 
turn, meanwhile, has been to the question of studying European identity. Good work has 
been done (see Herrmann, Risse et al 2004; Checkel and Katzenstein 2008), most 
impressively when it cuts itself loose from the hall of European mirrors that pre-packaged 
Euro data represents, and begins to generate new research models and methods for 
getting at the identity question with constructed samples of their own (Duchesne and 
Frognier 2002, Medrano 2003, Bruter 2004). But identity is not behaviour either, and it 
often presupposes a “groupist” ontology that again mystifies the search for a truly micro-
level base. Our preference would be to get ‘beyond identity’ altogether (see Favell 2005) 
and build upon the latest developments in cognitive and interactional studies of ethnicity 
(see Brubaker 2004).  
 
Sociology – as opposed to social theory – is all about operationalisation. As these 
tentative moves towards a more sociological understanding of Europeanised political 
behaviour show, it is by no means easy to design and implement methods for studying the 
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really study European integration sociologically we need to study real people. Not only 
the elites who are working in and for our favourite institutions in Brussels, and not 
Europeans reified as ethnic or national groups and collective identities. Rather, studies 
need to home in on the very real individuals experiencing and living out the micro-level 
consequences of macro-level regional integration on an everyday, social level, and whose 
actions and embodiments of Europe as an everyday practice aggregate somehow into the 
familiar political, institutional and pan-European societal structures we know. 
 
To some extent, these questions have been mapped out by historians and political 
econonomists. Hartmut Kaelble’s Auf der Weg der Europaïsche Gesellschaft (1987) for 
example, ought to be EU studies 101 required reading for scholars thinking about the 
structural sources of European convergence and integration around a certain social and 
economic model. Göran Therborn – a social theorist – draws heavily on Kaelble in his 
insightful European Modernity and Beyond (1995), the only broad work in contemporary 
social theory that is able and willing to ask genuinely empirical questions about the 
origins of contemporary Europe in the making. From other disciplinary perspectives, the 
big political economy has been filled out in recent work by Mattli (1999) and Katzenstein 
(2006), and it would be good too if more attention were paid to regional studies scholars 
in Geography who naturally think in terms that transcend narrow political institutional 
terms or the methodological nationalism of national-state-society focused studies, and 
whose disciplinary concepts are so better attuned to thinking about flows, transactions, 
scales and mobilities (see Dunford 1998; Rodriguez-Pose 2002). In political science 
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the Rokkan tradition to point towards mobile or regionalised populations that must be 
there if we are to have any adequate sociological understanding of how the EU has got 
this far. Again, he makes the point but goes no further. Another way of putting this would 
be to point out as Mattli and Fligstein do, that it is high time that we updated Haas and 
Deutsch. But how can it be done? How can we look at the macro-regional process of 
political integration through the microscope of everyday citizens’ lives? Here a few 
research examples can be proposed as points of departure. 
 
Networks  
 
The instinct of political scientists when faced with the big political sociology question of 
Europe has typically been to turn to political actors, and look for mobilisation or political 
organisation across borders (Imig and Tarrow 2001). This is undoubtedly happening, but 
it does reinforce again the perception that Europe is a phenomenon of and for certain 
elites. Yet beyond politics the networks can be far richer and much wider in their impact. 
In a fascinating exploratory work, Ulrich Krotz (2002) for example considers the multiple 
and diverse “para-public” links – the associations, exchanges, town twinnings and 
projects – that have underpinned on an everyday level the decades long transformation of 
German-French relations from enemies into peaceful bedfellows at the core of the 
European construction. The idea that this kind of societal stability is the outcome of only 
diplomatic bargaining of high politics is, of course, an illusion born of the narrowness of 
political studies of the subject. Transnationalism has to run much deeper if it is to hold 
  1sway over centuries of nationalist hostility. Historians such as Wolfram Kaiser are now 
beginning to explore the multiple ways in which cross-cutting political and social 
networks knitted together the visions of first Christian Democrat and later Socialist 
politicians in the making of Europe, with their roots far into business sectors and civil 
society. 
 
Movement 
 
A natural population to consider in the search for Europeans are those actively moving 
within Europe as a fruit of European free movement rights. This can mean, literally, the 
small but symbolically potent population of intra-EU migrants who must number among 
the most prototypical Europeans in the continent. In survey based and ethnographic work, 
Recchi, Favell and associates (Recchi and Favell 2008; Favell 2008) have explored the 
lives, careers and experiences of these ‘Eurostars’, often pointing to the hidden barriers 
they still face in flattened Europe, alongside their unsurprising affiliation to the European 
project. One key question is how such spatial mobility is linked to social mobility. Their 
findings suggest that while European mobiluty opportunities are more likely the province 
of upper-middle and upper class Europeans (which echoes Fligstein), there have been 
significant upward social mobility effects for migrants from the south of Europe, and for 
migrants who move to major metropolitan hubs, especially London. The effect of less 
than 2% of the current European population is not going to be structural, but their 
symbolism is clear. A bigger population of movers for sure are East-West migrants, a 
new migration system within Europe that is having profound structural effects on the 
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question of regional integration can be given a human face by considering these migrants 
as its vector. It also allows us to subvert the kind of easy conclusion that might be made 
from public opinion data: Eurosceptic Britain again turns out to be the most integrated 
member state in Europe if measured by the degree and extent of access enjoyed by new 
member state citizens to foreign labour markets. Britain and Ireland’s example have on 
this point led the way into an otherwise political doubtful acceptance across most of 
Western Europe that the transitional barriers to free movement had to come down. Other 
forms of immigration, too, are a key indicator of the regional integration processes that 
appear to be sweeping Europe along towards a much more porous and mobile North 
American migration/labour market model. The point is, that once movement is seen as a 
crucial indicator of regional integration, it can be seen everywhere. Trains, trucks, planes 
are all more mobile within Europe on a scale unimaginable twenty to thirty years ago, 
and even borders to external European neighbours are down well in advance of any kind 
of official political treaty or law hitting the books. Cross-border commuting, shopping, 
retirement migration, tourism and studying within Europe (King and Ruiz Gelices 2003) 
are all better measurements of European integration than Eurobarometer clapometers on 
whether the EU is a good thing today. The behaviour is there and not difficult to see; 
every movement, every experience is an infrastructural element in a social architecture 
that makes the existence of European institutions up there somewhere in the clouds so 
much more comprehensible. 
 
Consumption 
  1 
Mobility, of course, need not be physical movement. The four freedoms indeed have 
created many more opportunities for other forms of financial, material and symbolic 
mobility in the lives and daily organisation of individuals and families now living on a 
different European scale. In groundbreaking urban research in several major cities, 
Patrick Le Galès and associates have developed a survey that seeks to map out the spatial 
and newly Europeanised organisation of middle to upper middle class families in terms of 
social networks, consumption, business, travel, education of children and so on. The 
challenge will be to find meaningful ways of comparing these micro-level dimensions of 
regional integration over time, in comparison with an older, more nation-centered 
Europe, and across space, in terms of the distinction and blurring between the 
Europeanised and the globalised. But again, shifting the notion of European integration 
into this micro-political terrain reminds us of how narrow so much political science 
debate on Europeanisation has been in its single minded concern with tracing laws, 
institutions and policy processes rather than its broader causes and effects (Börzel 2002; 
Vink and Graziano 2006). We agree in this respect with Olsen that the term 
Europeanization should be an “attention-getting device and a starting point for further 
exploration” (Olsen 2002) but have to disagree with the idea that the term 
Europeanization is the property of political scientists who study compliance with EU law 
or only effects on policy and politics, an extremely narrow definition and agenda. 
 
Europeanisation, reopened to its sociological meanings, will be all about emergent class 
interests, as Fligstein suggests, certainly looser and more unpredictable aggregrations that 
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networks. No-one is suggesting that the European integration process is irreversible or 
that the social bases identified are cast in rock. The balance can change, earthquakes can 
happen; rights of mobility, movement across borders are a notably fragile achievement in 
a world still ruled by nationalised politics. But the stability of this construction over the 
fifty year long haul is striking. Even in the absence of an enthusiastic or highly mobilised 
population, and with the continual threat of political withdrawal, there is little to suggest 
any kind of roll back of European societal integration – and much to potentially suggest 
the opposite. Very little indeed may have yet been seen in terms of the consequences of 
everyday Europeanisation. Not that many people are moving, and only a minority have 
direct experience of the European citizenship rights of which the EU commission is so 
proud. But very few Europeans have been untouched in their material everyday lives by 
some aspect of European integration, and not many are actively imagining a different 
Europe. As is frequently said of the Erasmus generation, for whom Europe has become a 
banal, almost boring fact, it is too early to even see how deeply the European project has 
been anchored.  
 
Conclusion: the question of social power – and the future of EU studies 
 
We have argued that some kind of social basis to European integration is a necessary 
condition of any European integration at the political level. It is high time this became a 
priority topic on the EU theory agenda, and the object of more concerted research. The 
unresolved question we will leave hanging here is one about ‘domination’ or ‘social 
  1power’. The notion of a base underlying the political superstructure clearly contains some 
social order/stability premise, a sociological corollary to the well noted claim that the EU 
is currently in a stable equilibrium – for example by Moravcsik, in his recent post-
constitutional analysis of the state of the EU in the EUSA newsletter (2005). He may well 
be right, but again some kind of social structure is propping up this political-legal 
institutional settlement, if this is the case. It is however an open question in classic 
sociological terms, of whether this structure is consensual or conflict based. There are 
always distinct liberal and Marxist readings in the kind of comprehensive neo-Weberian 
sociology we are proposing here. Liberal leaning scholars may wish to accent the ways in 
which actual and incipient European integration reflects more or less precisely the 
behavioural interests of everyday Europeans in terms of how they organise their lives 
regionally, consume, travel, or map out their world on a European scale, etc. Marxist 
leaning scholars will want to accent the way these forms of behaviour reveal the social 
power or domination of particular classes or networks over others less well positioned to 
benefit from or think on a European scale, or perhaps identify the core dynamic as a 
struggle within elites for a definition of the national vs transnational in Europe. This 
question is ultimately a question of political outlook, and can be left hanging here, ‘to be 
discussed’. But let us first make sure EU studies does discuss it.  
 
Either way, in shifting our explanations of European integration away from the circular, 
auto-referential concerns of ‘integration theory’, away from the all consuming concerns 
of the  ‘policy process’ in Brussels, or the narrow conception of institutional 
Europeanisation, towards something deeper and more fundamental, we may do EU 
  2studies more generally a service. Something quite important is forced on EU studies by a 
genuine sociological agenda. Addressing the vast and difficult question of accounting for  
the social bases of European integration – in social, spatial and historical terms – 
researchers in the ‘top down’ mode of political science, law, IR or diplomatic history 
might also find new resources for a better defence of why studying European regional 
integration is crucial to the concerns of their own mainstream discipline. In the end, none 
of us like to be engaged in work that can be politely parked by the mainstream in some 
quiet side-street.  
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